King Makers?: Talk Radio, the Media Exemption, and Its
Impact on the Washington Political Landscape
Joshua M. Duffy†
The First Amendment protects five freedoms―[those] of religion,
speech, press, assembly and petition. All are precious, but why is
the political class so piously careful to exempt the press―the journalists who cover the political class―from restrictions the political
class writes for others? The question answers itself.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Political talk radio is a lucrative and influential business. Rush
Limbaugh, the most powerful voice in talk radio2 signed an eight-year
contract extension in 2008 for a total value of about $400 million.3 Limbaugh’s weekly listeners number somewhere between 14 and 20 million.4 Limbaugh was so influential in the Republican congressional elections of 1994, in which the Republicans took control of the House of
Representatives for the first time in 54 years, that the congressional Republicans made him an honorary member of the freshman class.5
Limbaugh, and other radio talk show hosts like him throughout the
country, exercise their influence in each political season. For instance, in
the 2008 presidential primaries, Limbaugh designed a radio campaign to
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1. George Will, Editorial, Journalism Exemption Is Not Good for the Gander, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, May 24, 2001, at 24, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/24362
_will24.shtml.
2. Michael Harrison, 2009 Talkers 250 Featuring the Heavy Hundred: The 100 Most Important
Radio Talk Show Hosts In America, TALKERS MAGAZINE, http://talkers.com/online/?p=267 (last
visited July 15, 2009).
3. Brian Stelter, A Lucrative Deal for Rush Limbaugh, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/business/media/03radio.html?_r=1.
4. Zev Chafets, Late-Period Limbaugh, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 6, 2008, at MM, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/magazine/06Limbaugh-t.html?pagewanted=2&hp.
5. Id.
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encourage Republicans to vote for Hillary Clinton in an effort to prolong
the bitter primary contest between Clinton and Barack Obama.6 Although the effect of Operation Chaos, as Limbaugh named this campaign, was difficult to measure, Senator John Kerry accused Limbaugh
of “tampering with the [Indiana] primary” and causing Obama’s defeat in
the primary.7 Since President Obama’s election, Limbaugh has continued to speak both for and against a number of political issues.8 For example, Limbaugh endorsed the President’s selection of Hillary Clinton as
Secretary of State and called it “a brilliant stroke by Obama.”9
Some have argued that because of its influence upon the electorate
and upon particular campaigns, such radio commentary should fall within applicable campaign finance regulations.10 They argue that if this type
of commentary is not regulated as a form of campaign contribution or
expenditure, media corporations could become king makers, providing
their favored candidates and ballot measure advocates with unlimited
access to the airwaves.11
The ability to provide an unlimited and undocumented platform for
selected issues or candidates would seem to be contrary to the policies
behind campaign finance regulations. Such regulations have admirable
goals: reducing the cost of political campaigns; equalizing the ability of
lesser-funded candidates to be heard; and reducing the possibilities for
corruption and the appearance of corruption.12 In spite of these laudable
policies, however, opponents of campaign finance regulations have
warned that such laws are subject to abuse and may have the result of
chilling or otherwise limiting socially useful and constitutionally protected political speech.13
It is here, in the conflict between the competing policies of the First
Amendment and campaign finance regulations, that the media exemption
exists, protecting talk radio from the reach of those regulations.14 As the
6. Id.
7. Id. Ten percent of Democratic primary voters in Indiana admitted to exit pollsters that they
were actually Republicans. Id.
8. Katie Escherich, Limbaugh Calls Clinton Pick ‘Brilliant Stroke’ by Obama, ABC NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/Politics/story?id=6368280.
9. Id.
10. Randall Gaylord & Mike Vaska, Opinion, Even Radio Shock Jocks Must Obey Campaign
Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource
.com/archive/?date=20051109&slug=vaska09.
11. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 840 n.10 (Wa. 2007).
12. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Washington, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157
P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 1893968.
13. Id; see also Cecil C. Kuhne III, The Diminishing Sphere of Political Speech: Implications
of an Overbearing Election Bureaucracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Respondents/Cross-Appellants’ (1) Response Brief to NNTG’s Appeal; and (2)
Opening Brief in Support of Respondents/Cross-Appellants’ Cross-Appeal, San Juan County v. No
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name suggests, the media exemption, or press exemption, exempts press
and media entities from campaign finance regulations on contributions
and expenditures.15
The conflict between the protection of the press and the goals of
campaign finance regulations reached a crescendo in Washington State
during the 2006 election cycle, culminating with the Washington State
Supreme Court 2007 decision in San Juan Island v. No New Gas Tax.16
The Supreme Court held that there is no limit on the extent to which talk
radio hosts may advocate or speak against a particular candidate or issue
and that their influence is not subject to any campaign finance restrictions.17 However, the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), and the United States
Supreme Court have each taken positions regarding the application of the
media exemption that are seemingly at odds with aspects of the court’s
ruling.
This Comment argues that despite the holding of the No New Gas
Tax court, Washington’s version of the media exemption should be narrowed in its application to talk show hosts, allowing it to more fully realize the goals of campaign finance regulations. Although it is difficult to
draw a line that balances the competing interests of First Amendment
protection and campaign finance regulations, it would be possible to narrow the media exemption so that First Amendment rights are protected,
while also better achieving the goals of campaign finance reform. This
Comment does not suggest that the individual conduct of a radio talk
show host should force the removal of the shield of the media exemption
and mandate that the broadcasting station disclose such conduct as an inkind contribution or expenditure of a political campaign, subject to the
same limits and restrictions as other contributions. Rather, this Comment
argues that talk show hosts who do not equally present both sides of
campaign issues should file a report with the Washington State Public
Disclosure Commission showing the duration and value of the air time
provided. This approach would protect the purpose of campaign finance
disclosures by revealing the equivalent amount of money an opponent
would have to spend to buy air time to promote their views or candidacy,
while also protecting free speech interests.18
New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2005 WL 4049964 [hereinafter “Response
Brief”].
15. Id.
16. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007).
17. Id. at 841.
18. This approach, it appears, was first suggested in a 1999 letter to the PDC. Letter from
Vicki L. Rippie, Assistant Director Public Information and Policy Development, Public Disclosure
Commission, to Mr. and Mrs. Michael J. Brewer, July 1, 1999, available at
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Part II discusses the legislative history of federal and Washington
State campaign finance laws and the media exemption. Part III examines
the media exemption and its application by the Federal Elections Commission. Part IV examines Washington State’s application of the media
exemption. Part V examines the ramifications of the decision in No New
Gas Tax on the media exemption and its application to the conduct of
radio talk show hosts. Finally, the argument is made that the media exemption could be narrowed to more effectively achieve the policy objectives of campaign finance regulations while preserving the First
Amendment protections of the press.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL AND WASHINGTON STATE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AND THE MEDIA EXEMPTION
Section A of this part looks to the history of campaign finance legislation to illustrate how the desire for disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures and the desire to limit the influence of money
shaped the current campaign regulatory system. Section B examines the
media exemption in federal and Washington State campaign finance regulations. Finally, Section C examines the manner in which the media
exemption spans the gap between the policy objectives of campaign
finance regulations and the protections of the First Amendment.
The purpose of this part is not to detail each phase of the evolutionary process of Washington State and federal campaign finance law.
Rather, the purpose is to provide a framework through which to better
understand how campaign finance legislation has been an attempt to control the influence of money on the political process and why such regulations are considered necessary. As will be seen, these regulations are
often seemingly at odds with constitutional protections of speech and the
press.19 The regulation of funds to support a political campaign, according to the United States Supreme Court, is the equivalent of regulating
speech.20 It is this tension between the policies behind the regulation of
campaign finance and the protection of speech and the press that is at the
heart of the media exemption.
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuan
CountyDocs.pdf, at 47. In its response to the proposal, the author stated that the PDC did not have
the legal authority to undertake such action because of the media exemption. Id. The response
further stated that while not unsympathetic to the concerns raised, the situation was not one into
which the PDC could interject any reporting responsibilities under current law. Id. at 48.
19. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
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A. A Brief History of Federal Campaign Finance Legislation
Although modern campaign finance legislation is often considered
to have started with the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),
campaign finance restrictions have existed in the United States since the
nineteenth century.21 The first federal campaign finance legislation was
a narrow 1867 law that prohibited federal officers from requesting contributions from Navy Yard workers.22 Prior to 1971, Congress enacted
multiple laws that sought broader regulation of federal campaign financing.23 The policies behind these laws included a desire to limit contributions to ensure that certain groups did not have a disproportionate influence on elections, a desire to prohibit certain sources of funds for campaign purposes, a desire to control spending, and a desire to require public disclosure of campaign finances to deter abuse and to educate the
electorate.24
The campaign finance provisions enacted before 1971, however,
were largely ineffective at achieving their policy objectives.25 Not only
did the provisions fail to provide an adequate administrative framework
to ensure compliance, but the provisions also contained a number of specific flaws that allowed campaigns to avoid the intended regulatory effect.26 Congress, reacting to the evasion of the campaign finance and
disclosure requirements that had accompanied earlier regulations, passed
the more stringent disclosure provisions of the FECA in 1971.27
The FECA of 1971 initiated fundamental changes in federal campaign finance laws, requiring full disclosure of campaign contributions
and expenditures and limiting spending on media advertisements.28 The
Act, signed into law by President Nixon in 1972, was not without its own
21. For a detailed history of campaign finance reform before 1971, see Melvin I. Urofsky,
Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 (2008).
22. The Federal Election Commission, Thirty Year Report (2005), at 3 n.3, http://www.fec.gov
/info/publications/30year.pdf.
23. Urofsky, supra note 21, at 33. Additionally, by 1959, forty-three states had some requirements for reporting campaign finance expenditures by candidates, their committees, or committees
run by the parties, and thirty-one states had some limits on expenditures. Id.
24. See id. at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 34. For example, under the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, a candidate could
avoid the spending limit and disclosure requirements altogether because a candidate who claimed to
have no knowledge of spending on his behalf was not liable under the act. Id. at 20–21.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 49. The law broadened the definitions of both “contributions” and “expenditures” in
order to include almost any donation and cost associated with a political campaign. Id. The FECA
set up specific rules for reporting contributions and expenditures, requiring that the names of all
donors or lenders who gave $100 or more be reported and requiring that the names of all committee
officials be listed. Id. Additionally, candidates now had limits on all media spending, both broadcast and print. Id. at 50.
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shortcomings, however, as it failed to provide for an independent body to
monitor and enforce the law.29 Ironically, these shortcomings were
brought into sharp focus by the Watergate scandal surrounding the 1972
presidential election.30
Although most of the crimes related to Watergate had little or nothing to do with campaign financing, public outrage grew as the facts of
how Nixon had raised and used money became known.31 The disclosures of Watergate fed the demand for more effective campaign finance
reform.32 The failure of the FECA of 1971 to provide for effective oversight of campaign finance laws was corrected in 1974 with establishment
of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as part of the 1974 Amendments to the FECA.33 The FEC was given jurisdiction in civil enforcement matters, authority to write regulations, and responsibility for monitoring compliance with the FECA.34
In addition to creating the FEC, the 1974 Amendments established
strict disclosure requirements for campaign contributions and set specific
limits for those donations.35 Also, the amended FECA prohibits corporations from making contributions or expenditures from their general treasury funds “in connection with” the election of any candidate for federal
office.36 Under the amendments, a contribution or expenditure includes
“direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money, or any services, or anything of value.”37 The Act defines “contribution” and “expenditure” to include “anything of value” made for the
purpose of influencing any election for federal office. 38 The term “anything of value” includes in-kind contributions.39 Based on the plain
meaning of this portion of the Act, it could be argued that a talk radio
29. The Federal Election Commission, Thirty Year Report (2005), at 4,
http://www.fec.gov/info/publications/30year.pdf.
30. Watergate was far more than a botched burglary; it was a worst-case scenario of a badly
flawed campaign finance system that failed to forestall corruption or prevent out-and-out criminal
activity. President Nixon’s reelection committee funneled illegal corporate contributions into slush
funds, paid for break-ins, and traded cash for favors. Id. at 50–55.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id. at 56. Although known as amendments, the 1974 measure addressed not only the perceived shortcomings of the 1971 FECA, but it also addressed almost every major provision within
the 1971 FECA. Id. See also, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55 (2000)).
34. Urofsky, supra note 21, at 56.
35. Id. at 60–61. In addition, the 1974 Amendments to the FECA also instituted the system of
public financing of presidential elections that is used today. Id. See also 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434
(2000).
36. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2008).
37. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000).
38. Id. § 431(8)–(9).
39. 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) (2005).
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host’s endorsement of a candidate or solicitation of support for a ballot
initiative would be a contribution to the respective campaign because that
support would be of value to the candidate.
Key portions of the 1974 amendments were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1976 in its controversial landmark decision, Buckley v.
Valeo.40 In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld individual contribution
limits to a federal candidate in each election,41 but it struck down the
FECA’s limits on expenditures by candidates as violating the First
Amendment.42 The Buckley Court held that campaign finance regulations may burden the exercise of political speech but must be narrowly
tailored to serve compelling government interests and must “satisfy the
exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment
rights of political expression.”43 Untouched by Buckley, however, was
the media exemption.
Despite the fact that Buckley did not specifically address the media
exemption, the Court’s reasoning seems to provide an avenue to a possible narrowing of the media exemption. Because Buckley held that campaign finance regulations may burden the exercise of political speech, the
media exemption could be narrowed to better serve the legitimate government interests of campaign finance regulations. This narrowing of the
media exemption would be possible so long as it is able to satisfy the
exacting scrutiny that would be given to limitations on rights of political
expression.
B. The Current Washington State and Federal Media Exemption
The federal media exemption, as well as its Washington State incarnation, was intended to preserve the First Amendment protections of
the press from the regulatory effect of campaign finance laws.44 As
campaign finance regulations have been amended and augmented in an
effort to more fully achieve their policy objectives, those regulations
have continued to exempt the media.45 To understand more fully how
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. Id. at 23–25. See also id. at 35–36, 38.
42. See id. at 39–51. For a detailed examination of the distinction between contributions and
expenditures recognized in Buckley, see Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1996).
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45. See also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 659 (1990) (recognizing that “the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption
supports the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate
form”).
44. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974); San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d
831, 839 (Wa. 2007).
45. The federal media exemption excludes from the definition of “expenditure”: “any news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, news-
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the media exemption impacts talk radio, as well as to understand what
changes would be necessary to effectively realize the policy objectives of
campaign finance regulations, it is necessary to examine the federal and
Washington State interpretations of the exemption.
The legislative history of the media exemption makes it clear that
Congress, in adopting the media exemption, recognized the tension between the First Amendment and campaign finance limits.46 Congress
expressed that its intent was to preserve the media’s traditional function
of public commentary and not to present legislation to limit or burden the
First Amendment freedoms of the press and of association.47 The exemption would assure the unfettered rights of the newspapers, TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns.48
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that exempting the
media from campaign finance regulations legitimately protects the
press’s unique role in “informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.”49
In an attempt to correct perceived flaws in the campaign finance
system, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA).50 The BCRA substantially amended campaign finance regulations by creating new regulations on “electioneering communication.”51
The BCRA adopts a broad definition of electioneering communication in
an effort to regulate more of certain types of speech than under the traditional FECA framework.52 The BCRA also exempts media entities from
its electioneering communication definition.53 While there was little debate about extending the media exemption to the newly formed provisions on electioneering communication,54 some argue that this extension
signified Congress’s commitment to the media exemption.55

paper, magazine, or other periodical publications, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by
any political party, political committee, or candidate.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2000).
46. H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (holding that a state may
exempt media entities from otherwise generally applicable campaign finance regulations).
50. Christopher P. Zubowicz, The New Press Corps: Applying the Federal Election Campaign
Act’s Press Exemption to Online Political Speech, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 94 (“It was simply understood [by Congress] that the media should continue to
get special protection in order to ensure that they are unfettered in the exercise of their First
Amendment rights.”).
55. Joshua L. Shapiro, Comment, Corporate Media Power, Corruption, and the Media Exemption, 55 EMORY L.J. 161, 173–174 (2006).
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Washington State campaign finance regulations have largely mirrored federal legislative intent and policy. In 1972, Washington voters
passed Initiative 276, later enacted as Washington Revised Code § 42.17,
which regulates the financing of political campaigns.56 In adopting Initiative 276, Washington voters consciously chose to implement campaign
contribution disclosure requirements similar to those of the 1971
FECA.57 The purpose of the measure was to promote “public confidence
in government at all levels” through a system of compelled disclosure of
campaign contributions and expenditures.58 Additionally, the public’s
right to know the financing of political campaigns and the financial affairs of elected officials and candidates was deemed to far outweigh “any
right that these matters remain secret and private.”59
In 1992, Washington voters approved Initiative 134, the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), which amended Washington Revised Code
§ 42.17.60 The FCPA supplemented the previously existing disclosure
requirements with certain limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures.61 The FCPA defines “contribution,” in relevant part, as
[a] loan, gift, deposit, subscription, forgiveness of indebtedness, donation, advance, pledge, payment, transfer of funds between political committees, or anything of value, including personal and professional services for less than full consideration;62
The financing by a person of the dissemination, distribution, or republication, in whole or in part, of broadcast, written, graphic, or
other form of political advertising or electioneering communication

56. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 834 (Wa. 2007). See also 1973 Wash.
Sess. Laws. ch. 1 § 1.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.010(8) (2008). In adopting Initiative 276, Washington voters
declared that the “concepts of disclosure and limitation of election campaign financing are established by the passage of the [FECA] of 1971 by the Congress of the United States, and in consequence thereof, it is desirable to have implementing legislation at the state level.” Id.
58. Id. § 42.17.010(1),(5) (2008).
59. Id. § 42.17.010(10) (2008). See also Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d 911 (1974). In Fritz, the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the FECA against free speech and other constitutional challenges. The court noted: “The electorate . . . has the right to know of the sources and magnitude of
financial and persuasional influences upon government.” Id. at 931. In rejecting the challenge, the
court said: “We accept as self-evident . . . that the right to receive information is the fundamental
counterpart of the right of free speech. . . . [The Act] seeks to enlarge the information base upon
which the electorate makes its decisions.” Id. at 924–25.
60. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834. See also 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws. ch. 2 §§ 1–36.
61. Among other changes mandated by Initiative 134, the FCPA made it illegal to either give
or receive a contribution of more than $5,000 to any campaign within twenty-one days of an election. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.105(8) (2008).
62. Id. § 42.17.020 (15)(a)(i) (2008).
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prepared by a candidate, a political committee, or its authorized
agent.63

At the same time, however, the definition of “contribution” was amended
to expressly exempt certain press activities:
“Contribution” does not include: . . . A news item, feature, commentary or editorial in a regularly scheduled news medium that is of
primary interest to the general public, that is in a news medium controlled by a person whose business is that news medium, and that is
not controlled by a candidate or political committee.64

Following the passage of the BCRA and the United States Supreme
Court’s decision upholding the new federal regulations of “electioneering
communication,”65 the Washington legislature adopted similar regulations of “electioneering communications” and likewise incorporated the
media exemption for
[a] news item, feature, commentary, or editorial in a regularly scheduled news medium that is: (i) Of primary interest to the general
public; (ii) In a news medium controlled by a person whose business is that news medium; and (iii) Not a medium controlled by a
candidate or a political committee.66

Although the federal and Washington State media exemptions have textual differences, Washington’s statute expressly incorporated the federal
courts’ construction of the media exemption.67 The Washington State
Supreme Court found that by adopting the federal courts’ construction,
the voters intended the state media exemption to be functionally equivalent to, and to be interpreted in accordance with, the federal media exemption.68
C. Protection of the Press and the Interpretation of the Media
Exemption
The media exemption spans the gap between speech protected by
the First Amendment and the regulation of campaign contributions and
expenditures. Because the media’s role in society is unique, courts have
been steadfast in their protection of the press. Such steadfast protection,
63. Id. § 42.17.020(15)(a)(iii) (2008).
64. Id. § 42.17.020(15)(b)(iv) (2008).
65. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(21)(c) (2008). See also supra note 38.
67. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 838 (Wa. 2007).
68. Id. The state media exemption differs from the federal media exemption in that the language “distributed through the facilities of” any media source is replaced with “in a regularly scheduled news medium that is of primary interest to the general public.” Id.. See also 2 U.S.C. §
431(9)(B)(i) (2000).
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however, does not mean that the media exemption is the necessary means
of maintaining such protection. While recognizing the necessary function of the press, the courts have repeatedly indicated that certain limits
would be permissible.
The Supreme Court has championed the role of the press as fundamental to the protection of free society. In New York Times v. Sullivan,69
for example, the Court stated that there is “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”70 Two years later, in Mills v. Alabama,71 the Court held that
“[s]uppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize government
agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, . . . muzzles one
of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and
deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.”72 Any efforts that might limit the media function, whether by means of campaign
finance regulations or some other mechanism, must therefore be prevented from impinging on the constitutional standing of the press.73
The constitutionality of the media exemption is premised upon the
special role of press endorsements during elections.74 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,75 for example, the Court examined a Michigan campaign finance law that barred corporations from engaging in
campaign expenditures from corporate treasury funds in support of or in
opposition to candidates for state office.76 The plaintiffs argued that the
law’s ban on corporate campaign expenditures was a violation of the

69. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. Id. at 270.
71. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, (1966). In Mills, Birmingham held an election regarding
which form of city government the voters preferred. Id. at 215. The editor of a local paper was
arrested after he ran an editorial on election day supporting a mayor-council form of government.
Id. at 215−16.
72. Id. at 219.
73. It is worth noting, however, that the framers did not design, nor has the United States Supreme Court recognized, a protection for the press that extends beyond the protection of other
speech. In his concurring opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 756 (1978), for example, Chief Justice Burger stated that “the history of the [Press] Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or ‘institutional’ privilege.” Id. at 798. See also Richard L. Hasen,
Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1657–58 (1999)
(noting that “there is scant evidence that the framers’ original intent in writing the Constitution was
to give the media greater constitutional protection through the Press Clause than society was to receive through the Speech Clause of the First Amendment”).
74. Hasen, supra note 73, at 1658.
75. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
76. Id. at 654.
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Equal Protection Clause because the law contained a media exemption
very similar to the FECA’s media exemption.77
The Court noted, however, that it had consistently recognized the
unique role of the press. The Court held that “[a]lthough all corporations
enjoy the same state-conferred benefits inherent in the corporate form,
media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that
their resources are devoted to the collection of information and its dissemination to the public.”78 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall
noted that without the media exemption, the Act’s definition of “expenditure” could conceivably be interpreted to encompass election related news stories and editorials.79 Therefore, the Court found that although the Act’s restriction on independent expenditures might otherwise
discourage news broadcasters or publishers from serving their crucial
societal role, the media exemption ensures that the Act does not hinder or
prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events.80 Justice Marshall continued: “Although the press’ unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater
protection under the Constitution, it does provide a compelling reason for
the State to exempt media corporations from the scope of political expenditure limitations.”81
While Marshall’s discussion of the unique role of the press suggests
that the media’s exemption from campaign finance restrictions might be
a constitutional requirement,82 the Court noted that regulations that impinge on the right to engage in political expression may be permissible if
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.83 Additionally, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Austin, suggested that it would
be constitutional to end the media exemption entirely. Justice Scalia

77. Id. at 666. The Michigan law regulating corporate expenditures excluded from the definition of an expenditure any “expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical or publication of any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of or opposition to a
candidate for elective office . . . in the regular course of publication or broadcasting.” Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. 169.206(3)(d) (West 1989). The court, after quoting this provision, noted that the FECA
“contains a similar exemption.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 667 n.5.
78. Austin, 494 U.S. at 667.
79. Id. at 668.
80. Id.
81. Id. It should be noted that the narrowing of the media exemption suggested by this Comment would continue to exempt media entities from the scope of any political contribution or expenditure limitations.
82. See Hasen, supra note 73, at 1651−52.
83. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666. The Court specifically held that Michigan’s decision to regulate
only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the
political process the corrosive effect of political “war chests” amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations. Id.
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noted that the Court did not hold that the media exception was constitutionally required, only permissible.84
In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted the media exemption’s inherent
contradictions to the purposes of campaign finance regulations. 85 He
noted that while the majority found Michigan’s campaign regulations
constitutional because of the compelling state need to prevent amassed
corporate wealth from skewing the political debate, the unique role of the
press would seem to provide an especially strong reason to include it in
Michigan’s corporate restrictions.86
Amassed corporate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary
channels of information is much more likely to produce [too much
of one point of view] than amassed corporate wealth that is generally busy making money elsewhere. Such media corporations not only have vastly greater power to perpetrate the evil of overinforming,
they also have vastly greater opportunity.87

While Justice Scalia wrote for the dissenting justices, his comments
ought to give pause as the application of the media exemption to talk radio hosts is considered. As Justice Scalia noted, one of the purposes of
campaign finance regulations is to prevent the amassed wealth of corporations from skewing political debate.88 One must also assume that the
amassed power of the media, and of talk radio in particular, is also able
to skew political debate.
Although Austin reached the Court long before McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,89 the justices’ rationale in Austin seemed to
remain intact even after the BCRA.90 While the BCRA adopted a broad
definition of electioneering communication to regulate even more speech
than under the traditional FECA framework, the Court in McConnell

84. Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds merely that media corporations
may be excluded from Michigan law, not that they must be.”). Justice Scalia stated that “[T]he
Court’s holding on [the media exemption] must be put in the following unencouraging form: ‘Although the press’ unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitution, . . . it does provide a compelling reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the
scope of political expenditure limitations.’ One must hope, I suppose, that Michigan will continue to
provide this generous and voluntary exemption.” Id. at 691−92.
85. Id. at 691.
86. Id. at 690−91.
87. Id. at 691.
88. Id. at 690−91.
89. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
90. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 88-90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. III 2003)). See also Zubowicz, supra note 50, at 8 (noting that the
broad aims of the BCRA were to reduce the perceived influence of non-federal funds on federal
elections, to regulate certain electioneering communications, and to alter the government’s approach
to certain coordinated expenditures).
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continued to exempt the media from such restrictions.91 Justices Stevens
and O’Connor, writing for the majority, dismissed a challenge that the
BCRA was fatally under-inclusive because the electioneering communication provisions discriminated in favor of media corporations and gave
“free reign to media companies to engage in speech without resort to
PAC money.”92 They explained that Congress had the authority to act
incrementally in regulating this area.93 The majority cited Austin for the
proposition that a valid distinction exists between corporations that are
part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in
the regular business of imparting news to the public.94 The Court, while
affirming Congress’s ability to protect the political speech expressed in
media commentary, did not state, however, that such a distinction was
constitutionally required.95 Instead, the Court echoed Austin, indicating
that it did not consider the media exemption a constitutional requirement,
that such an exemption was permissible,96 and that Congress had the authority to proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance
regulation.97
As was the case with Buckley, the Court in McConnell seems to
have left the door open to a possible narrowing of the media exemption
by Congress. Because the exemption is permissible, but not constitutionally required, Congress could narrow the exemption to better achieve
the goals of campaign finance regulations without chilling political
speech. The Washington State Supreme Court, as will be discussed in
Part V, chose to take the further step of directly stating that a narrower
exception would be within the power of the legislature.98
IV. THE MEDIA EXEMPTION AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE FEC
Given the protection of speech and of the press within the First
Amendment, and given the competing policy objectives of campaign
finance regulations, it is necessary to understand when the media exemption is applicable to what would otherwise be a campaign contribution.
If a media outlet is acting within the requirements of the exemption, conduct that would otherwise be a violation of campaign finance regulations
is protected. By looking at the manner in which the FEC determines the
applicability of the media exemption, it is possible to understand why
91. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
96. Id. at 108.
97. Id. at 158.
98. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 840 n.10 (Wa. 2007).
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talk radio commentary can present particular challenges to the application of the exemption. Also, an examination of the aspects of particular
instances in which the FEC applied the exemption helps in understanding
how a narrowing of the media exemption would better serve the policy
objectives of campaign finance regulations.
To determine whether the media exemption applies in individual
cases, the FEC must evaluate whether the entity engaging in the activity
is a media entity within the meaning of the FECA and the FEC’s regulations.99 As previously noted, the FECA’s media exemption applies to
“any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication.”100
After the FEC concludes that there is a qualifying press entity for
the purposes of the exemption, the Commission must determine whether
the activity at issue was a legitimate press function.101 To answer this
question, the FEC considers two criteria: (1) whether the press entity is
owned or controlled by a political party, political committee, or candidate; and (2) whether the press entity is operating within its legitimate
press function.102 If the media entity is independent of any political party, committee, or candidate, and if it was acting as a legitimate media
entity at the time of the alleged violation, it is exempt from the FECA’s
restrictions on corporate contributions and expenditures, and the FEC’s
inquiry should end.103 In applying this analysis, the FEC considers
whether the entity’s materials are available to the general public and are
comparable in form to those ordinarily issued by the entity.”104
99. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-16, 5 (2005), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/
saos/searchao. From this link, enter the Advisory Opinion number in the “Go to AO number” box.
See also FEC, Advisory Op. 2004-07 (2004), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao.
100. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2000). For a comprehensive look at the FEC process for determining a press entity, see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986).
101. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1312−13 (D.D.C.
1981).
102. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-16, 5 (2005), available at
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao.
103. See id.
104. Id. This test was first promulgated in Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210
(1981). The district court noted that “[n]o explicit reference is to be found in the statue to this twostep process. It seems to me, however, to be the necessary accommodation between, on the one
hand, the Commission’s duty to investigate possible violations and, on the other, the statutory exemption for the press combined with a First Amendment distaste for government investigations of
press functions.” Id. at 1215. See also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 517 F. Supp
1308 (D.D.C. 1981). The court in Phillips outlined a similar two-part test to determine whether the
media exemption is available with respect to a particular communication. The court explained:
[T]he initial inquiry is limited to whether the press entity is owned or controlled by a political party or candidate and whether the press entity was acting as a press entity with respect to the conduct in question. If the press entity is not owned or controlled by a politi-
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A. Political Control and Legitimate Press Function
To be exempt from contribution or expenditure requirements under
the media exemption, an organization must be engaged in legitimate media activity.105 This does not mean, however, that for the exemption to
apply, the press entity must function exactly as it usually does,106 nor
does legitimate media activity depend on an objective presentation.107
One commentator has noted that if an organization can convince the
commission that it is a genuine press entity that is not under political
control, then the commission will not subject its conduct to rigorous
scrutiny as to the nature of the press function and likely will conclude
that the entity’s activity is covered by the exemption.108 The FEC will
determine that the exemption does not apply only if it is clear that the
conduct of the press entity was inappropriate.109
B. In re Dave Ross
In an analysis of the FEC’s application of the media exemption to
talk radio hosts involved in political campaigns, the tension between the
policy objectives of campaign finance regulations and the protections of
the First Amendment is plainly apparent. It is clear that talk radio hosts
could engage in conduct that would otherwise be subject to campaign
finance regulations but for the media exemption. It is equally apparent,
however, that certain conduct should continue to be protected by the media exemption because it does not conflict with the goals of campaign
finance legislation. In these cases, the application of the media exemption successfully balances the competing interest of campaign finance
regulations with the First Amendment protections.
The FEC has received many complaints and has issued a number of
advisory opinions that set out the breadth of the federal media exemption

cal party or candidate and is acting as a press entity, the FEC lacks subject matter jurisdiction and is barred from investigating the subject matter of the complaint.
Id. at 1313.
105. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 208 (2003).
106. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 4 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006) (statement of reasons), available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf. See also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986) (holding that the press exemption did not apply to a special
edition of a newsletter because it was not comparable to any single issue of newsletter).
107. FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-19, 5 (2005), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao.
Therefore, a media entity otherwise eligible for the media exemption would not lose its eligibility
merely because of a lack of objectivity in a news story, commentary, or editorial, even if the content
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.
108. Zubowicz, supra note 50, at 19.
109. Id.
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as applied to broadcast media.110 The Commission has also specifically
addressed the issue of whether the on-air conduct of talk radio hosts, and
talk radio station ownership, falls within the media exemption, or whether such conduct should be considered an in-kind contribution or expenditure.111 An understanding of the rationale used by the FEC aids not only
in the understanding of the application of the media exemption in Washington State, but also aids in an understanding of how and why the media
exemption might be narrowed for certain on-air commentary.
In a recent Washington State case, the FEC issued an opinion about
the on-air conduct of a radio talk show host who was also a congressional candidate.112 Dave Ross, host of a talk show on radio station KIROAM in Seattle, Washington, was a candidate for Washington’s Eighth
Congressional District in 2004.113 The Washington State Republican
Party filed a complaint with the FEC, alleging that KIRO-AM knowingly
and willfully made, and Ross and his campaign committee knowingly
and willfully accepted, illegal in-kind contributions.114 The FEC concluded that the media exemption applied, and it found no reason to believe that the FECA had been violated.115
In that case, Ross had hosted “The Dave Ross Show” on KIRO-AM
since 1987.116 The show aired in Washington’s Eighth Congressional
District five days a week for three hours a day.117 On it, Ross discussed
news, current events, politics, entertainment, technology, and other sub-

110. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2000-13 (2000), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/
saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=656 (considering whether the media exemption applied to gavelto-gavel coverage of the Republican and Democratic national conventions; concluding that “gavel-to
gavel-coverage of national party conventions that includes interviews and commentary by journalists, by an entity that covers governmental and political affairs, readily fits into the categories of
news story and commentary set out in the Act”). See also, FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-19 (2005),
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao. The FEC considered three scenarios: (1) a program host mentions a candidate on the air, (2) a candidate is interviewed on a program, and (3) a
person calling into a program mentions a candidate. The FEC concluded that all of these activities
“would be legitimate press functions; [and] would come within the press exemption[.]” Id.
111. See, e.g., Dave Ross, MUR 5555, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report),
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 1.
115. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 1 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006) (statement of reasons), available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf.
116. The Dave Ross Show, http://www.mynorthwest.com/?sid=21762&nid=130 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2009). Dave Ross has also had a daily commentary on CBS Radio Network since 1983,
which is heard nationally. He also substitutes regularly for Charles Osgood on “The Osgood File”
on CBS News Radio, which is carried on approximately 240 stations nationwide, including KIROAM. Id.
117. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 4 (FEC, Nov. 19, 2004) (Joint Response of Friends of Dave Ross
et al. to the Complaint by Chris Vance), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C2.pdf.
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jects.118 The complaint alleged that on May 5, 2004, during his show,
Ross first publicly contemplated a run for Congress by stating: “I can just
assume that [State Democratic Party Chairman Paul Berendt] thinks my
name recognition would be a good thing.”119 Additionally, between May
5th and May 20th, 2004, a guest host on the Dave Ross Show asked listeners whether Ross should run for Congress. An online survey on the
same topic ran on the station’s website; the website also reportedly “heralded Ross’s candidacy with headlines stating ‘Dave for Congress’ and
a prominent link to his campaign website.”120 Although Ross announced
his decision to run for Congress on May 20, 2004, he remained on the air
and continued to host The Dave Ross Show until July 23, 2004.121 From
the time Ross stopped hosting his show, through the general election in
November 2004, KIRO-AM continued referring to Ross’ daily time slot
as “The Dave Ross Show,” using a guest host to run it.122 On September
14, 2004, Dave Ross won the primary election. The next day, the Dave
Ross Show featured Dave Ross as a special guest to discuss his primary
victory.123
In its evaluation of the facts alleged in the complaint and answer,
the FEC looked specifically at the alleged corporate contributions and the
media exemption.124 The FEC concluded that the broadcasting station
“is the type of media entity covered by the media exemption and is not
owned or controlled by a political party, committee or candidate.”125 The
FEC concluded that the sole question, then, was whether the station was
acting within its legitimate press function.126
The FEC found that KIRO-AM was acting within its legitimate
press function.127 The Commission found that the format, distribution,
118. Id.
119. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 2 (FEC, Oct. 5, 2004) (Complaint Against Mr. Dave Ross et al.),
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050BF.pdf.
120. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 3, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
121. Id. The FEC, in its First General Counsel’s Report, did note, however, that Ross announced his candidacy during an event called “Battle of the Talk Show Hosts,” broadcast on KIROAM in the evening of May 20, 2004. The station’s response to the FEC stated that Ross’s announcement was in response to a direct question asked of him by the emcee of the evening concerning rumors she had heard. Neither KIRO nor [its corporate owner] had prior knowledge that such an
event would occur. Id. at 3 n.2. Ross officially became a candidate for federal office on June 2,
2004, when he received contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000. Id. at 3 n.3.
122. Id. at 3. Also, during August 2004, Ross gave nineteen commentary pieces for CBS News
radio, which may have aired in Washington’s Eighth Congressional district on CBS affiliate KIROAM. Id. at 3–4.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 5.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 7.
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and production of the show were not altered during the period in question.128 “In addition to avoiding discussion of his candidacy, Mr. Ross
specifically avoided any solicitation of or response to any questions by
listeners regarding his candidacy during the call-in portions of the
show.”129 Additionally, the FEC noted that other on-air personalities
were also given strict directives by the station, prohibiting them from
referring to Ross’s campaign on the air.130 Regarding the broadcasts of
the Dave Ross Show with guest hosts, the Commission found no indication that those shows were anything other than regularly scheduled programs of news, editorials, or commentary.131
The FEC also found that KIRO’s broadcasts of the Dave Ross
Show within the electioneer communications period132 qualified for the
media exemption for electioneering communications under the same rationale by which they qualified for the media exemption from the definition of “expenditure.”133
128. Id. Although the Commission stated that the issue in Ross did not turn on the question of
whether anything about Ross’s talk show changed after Ross became a candidate and stayed on the
air, the FEC found little indication that anything about the Dave Ross Show changed after Ross
became a candidate and stayed on the air. See Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 5 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006)
(statement of reasons), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf, and Dave Ross,
MUR 5555, 6, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
129. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 7, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
130. Id. As to the two instances that Ross did in fact reference his candidacy or potential candidacy (one statement that he was considering running, and a second acknowledging that he was
running), the FEC concluded that “these incidents do not appear to take either [of those two specific
shows] outside the station’s legitimate press function.” Id. With regard to the poll taken on the
KIRO website asking whether Ross should become a candidate, the Commission also found that to
fall within the media exemption. Id. at 8. Because the show regularly featured discussions about
news, politics, and current events, “it falls within the range of what qualifies as ‘legitimate press
activity’ for such a show to post on its web site surveys regarding issues in politics, current events,
and popular culture.” Id. The FEC concluded that because there was no apparent attempt to use the
results in an actual determination of Ross’ possible candidacy, the poll should not be treated as a
“testing the waters” contribution or expenditure. Id. at 8–9. See also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.131(a), 101.3
(2003). It is worth noting that the FEC found that the same media exemption analysis it applied with
regard to Ross’s appearance on KIRO-AM also applied to his appearance on CBS News Radio.
Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 10, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
131. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 8, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
132. An electioneering communication occurs where a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication targeted to the relevant electorate clearly identifies a federal candidate within thirty days of a
primary election or sixty days of a general election. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2005). The FEC noted
that Ross stopped hosting the Dave Ross show more than thirty days before the primary election and
more than sixty days before the general election. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 11, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006)
(First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
133. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 11, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf.
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The FEC’s conclusion regarding the Dave Ross Show was not
unique, as the FEC reached similar conclusions in other opinions. In
1992, for example, the FEC was asked for an advisory opinion concerning the application of the FECA of 1971, as amended, and FEC regulations about “the airing of your radio show while you are a candidate for
Federal office.”134 In that case, the candidate, Randall Terry, had been
the host of a daily radio talk show, the “Randall Terry Show,” that dealt
with “all major contemporary issues . . . in which the news of the day is
discussed.”135
While the candidate asked the FEC whether he might continue to
host his radio show while running for office, the FEC specifically addressed the issues of whether the expenses incurred by Randall Terry
Live, Inc., or by the radio stations or network carrying the show, would
be in-kind corporate contributions to the campaign.136 The Commission
concluded that the candidate could continue hosting his talk show, without receiving an in-kind contribution, based on the candidate’s representations that he did not intend to use the show to promote or raise funds
for his candidacy and that no ads raising funds for or promoting his candidacy would be run during the show.137
Although the FEC found the radio stations to be acting within their
legitimate press function in Ross and Terry, it is significant that the FEC
issued its opinions based on the fact that neither Ross nor Terry were
engaged in on-air commentary about their respective campaigns. Since
the hosts were not directly promoting their respective campaigns, they
were arguably not making in-kind contributions to those campaigns.
Where there are no such contributions, the policy objectives behind campaign finance regulations are not stifled by First Amendment protections.
Thus, the application of the media exemption in these cases successfully
balanced the competing First Amendment interest and campaign finance
purposes. A narrowing of the media exemption to require disclosure of
134. FEC, Advisory Opinion 1992-37 (1992), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos
/searchao.
135. Id. The show, entitled “Randall Terry Live,” was broadcast on approximately ninety-five
stations nationwide, but on only one station in New York State, where Terry was a candidate. In his
letter to the FEC, Terry stated that the signal from the state station reached areas west of the district
for which he was a candidate, but that “the signal is almost extinct” at the district boundary. Id.
Additionally, Terry informed the FEC that he was a contractual employee of Randall Terry Live,
Inc., and not an owner in any form; a family member was the sole incorporator, and neither the
family member nor the corporation had made any donations or in-kind contributions to the campaign. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Commission also stated that it interpreted the candidate’s representation to include a commitment to refrain from attacks on his opponents and from soliciting funds or airing ads
for those purposes. Id.
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on-air contributions would seemingly not have applied to the conduct of
either Ross or Terry.
V. WASHINGTON STATE’S APPLICATION OF THE MEDIA EXEMPTION
An analysis of Washington State’s application of the media exemption to the on-air conduct of radio talk show hosts highlights the troublesome aspects of the media exemption’s conflict with the policies of campaign finance regulations. Such an analysis also suggests the manner in
which the media exemption might be narrowed to more fully achieve the
goals of campaign finance regulations while not limiting the speech of
the press in any substantial manner. By looking first to Washington
State law, and then to the PDC’s application of the media exemption to
radio talk show hosts, and finally to the courts’ application of the exemption, the complexities of the issue can be clearly understood.
In Washington State, “political advertising” is not included within
the media exemption.138 Political advertising includes, in part, “radio or
television presentations, or other means of mass communication, used for
the purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial
or other support in any election campaign.”139 The PDC has further defined the term “political advertising” as it relates to the media exemption.
Washington Administrative Code § 390-05-290 provides:
Political advertising does not include letters to the editor, news or
feature articles, editorial comments or replies thereto in a regularly
published newspaper, periodical, or on a radio or television broadcast where payment for the printed space or broadcast time is not
normally required.

Therefore, the media exemption would apply to coverage about a ballot
measure or candidate when it takes place during the content portion of a
program, when payment is normally not required.
Additionally, in interpreting Washington law, the PDC “consider[s]
the approach of the Federal Elections Commission[.]”140 As previously
noted, federal interpretations of the federal media exemption are helpful
because the Washington statute expressly incorporated the federal courts’
construction of the media exemption. However, the PDC is not bound by
the FEC decisions, “given the different history and text of the Washington State statute.”141

138. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(15)(b)(iv) (2008).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(38) (2008).
140. Edelman v. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 99 P.3d 386, 393 (2004).
141. Id.
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A. Is There an In-Kind Contribution When a Radio Station Provides
Broadcast Time to a Talk Show Host?
Although the FEC found in In Re Ross that the media exemption
applied and that the station did not make an in-kind contribution to the
Dave Ross campaign, it did not address the question of whether such an
in-kind contribution is made by a talk show host who is a candidate and
who voices his support for himself as candidate. In Washington State,
this question has been addressed by both the PDC and the Washington
State Supreme Court. This section examines the approach taken by each.
While the position adopted by the PDC was overruled by the court
in No New Gas Tax, the PDC’s analysis and determination that a radio
station broadcasting a talk show whose host was a candidate for office
would make an in-kind contribution to the candidate not only highlights
the need for reform in this area, but it also offers a method to determine
when such a contribution is made. For a narrowing of the media exemption to be effective in more fully realizing the goal of campaign finance
reform, there must be a method to determine what constitutes a contribution that should be disclosed. The PDC has suggested such an approach.142
In the context of a radio talk show host who was a candidate for office, the PDC concluded that a radio station would be making an in-kind
contribution to the candidate if the candidate used his or her radio show
to conduct political advertising.143 In an advisory opinion, the PDC specifically addressed the question of “whether a radio/television talk show
host who becomes a candidate for state office under the Public Disclosure Law must report the time he is regularly on the air after becoming a
candidate as an in-kind contribution from his employer.”144 In its opinion, the PDC recognized that the law does exclude a news item, feature,
commentary, or editorial given as part of a broadcast media program
from the definition of contribution, assuming that certain standards are
met.145 The PDC stated, however, that a news item, feature, or commentary must be contrasted with “political advertising,” “which is defined to
142. PDC, Advisory Op., 45 (Aug. 29,1995), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/
commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuanCountyDocs.pdf.
143. Id. at 44.
144. Id. at 43. The PDC also addressed the issue of whether the on-air time would be a contribution subject to limit pursuant to Initiative 134, which stated, inter alia, that no person may give a
candidate for statewide office more than $1,000 per election. Id. The PDC’s opinion was specifically addressed with regard to a “station employee who, as a talk show host, expresses his opinion and
invites listener comments about the policies and performance of public officials, including officials
who may be his opponents in the campaign, and about state and local issues that may be campaign
issues.” Id. at 44.
145. Id.
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include any radio . . . presentation used for the purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial or other support in any election campaign.”146 The PDC concluded that “the donation or transfer at
less than full market value of political advertising, or the resources to
produce and disseminate political advertising (such as free airtime),
would be considered a contribution.”147
In its analysis, the PDC found five factors to be pertinent, and it advised that “persons relying on the conclusions herein should determine
whether their circumstances are consistent with these underlying
facts.”148 First, the PDC found that the radio host was a long-time employee of the station and clearly not hired in anticipation of his candidacy.149 Second, neither the station nor its parent company was owned or
controlled by the candidate, and no one associated with control of the
station would be associated with the candidate’s campaign.150 Third, the
talk show host would be on the air as part of his regularly scheduled program, and no changes in the production, nature, format, length, or time
slot of the show were to take place after he became a candidate or in anticipation of his candidacy.151 Fourth, no changes in the terms and conditions of the host’s employment or compensation were to occur after he
became a candidate or in anticipation of his candidacy.152 And finally,
the PDC relied on the fact that no paid political ads supporting the talk
show host’s candidacy or opposing the candidacy of any of his opponents would air during his program.153
Under the PDC’s Advisory Opinion, a talk show host, as a candidate, would receive a contribution from the radio station if, while on the
air, the host
Solicits votes, expressly advocates or expressly discusses his candidacy, or expressly discusses the candidacy of any of his opponents;
Solicits or accepts contributions or campaign volunteers;
Expressly advocates the defeat of opposing candidates.154

146. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(32) (2008); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-05290 (2008) (defining “political advertising”).
147. PDC, Advisory Op., 44 (Aug. 29,1995), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/
commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuanCountyDocs.pdf.
148. Id. at 43−45.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 44−45.
153. Id. at 45.
154. Id.
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The Commission found that such airtime would be a contribution because it constituted something of value to the campaign for which the
candidate did not provide consideration.155 “Furthermore, the use of airtime by a candidate to promote his candidacy does not fall within the
exception for news, features, commentaries, and editorials provided in
the public interest.”156 Such airtime, the Commission continued, would
be considered “political advertising.”157
The talk show host referenced in the PDC opinion worked for radio
station KVI AM, owned by Fisher Communications.158 Fisher stated that
the Commission’s Opinion requiring such disclosure “strikes a reasonable balance between important public policies” and “provides a relatively
clear rule that is easily applicable by broadcasters.”159
While the PDC opinion would provide a relatively clear rule that
could be applied by broadcasters, such an approach was rejected by the
Washington State Supreme Court in No New Gas Tax.160 However, if the
media exemption were narrowed such that talk show hosts who do not
equally present both sides of campaign issues were required to file a report with the PDC showing the duration and value of the air time provided, the public would know the equivalent amount of money an opponent would have to spend to buy air time to promote their views or candidacy. As long as contribution limits do not apply, political speech
would not be chilled, and free speech interests would be protected.
B. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax
Whereas the PDC looked at the use of airtime in support of a candidate, the issue in No New Gas Tax concerned the use of airtime in support of a ballot measure.161 The proposal suggested in this Comment
would be equally applicable regardless of whether the airtime was used
to support a candidate or a ballot measure because the disclosure of a
contribution would be based upon unequal promotion of an issue or candidate.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The PDC stated that airtime that constituted a contribution in this context must be
valued in the amount of its fair market value. Id. at 46. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-16206(3) (2008).
158. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 2.
159. Id.
160. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 840 (Wa. 2007).
161. Prior to No New Gas Tax, the PDC had not been asked to adopt a rule or issue an advisory
opinion about how the media exemption applied to a talk show host who could potentially be a political committee supporting or opposing a ballot measure. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Attorney General, at 13 n.2, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 05-2-01205-3),
2005 WL 4158306.
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Subsection 1 briefly examines the events leading to the dispute in
No New Gas Tax, and specifically, the on-air conduct of two radio talk
show hosts. Subsection 2 discusses the initial allegations against the No
New Gas Tax political committee and also looks at the initial Superior
Court ruling. Subsection 3 examines the legal ramifications of the ruling
and surveys the reaction to the Superior Court decision. Finally, Subsection 4 discusses the reasoning and the holding of the Washington State
Supreme Court in No New Gas Tax.
1. Background
In the spring of 2005, the Washington legislature adopted a 9.5cent-per-gallon increase in the state gasoline tax to pay for improvements
in the state’s roads and highway system.162 During that time, Kirby Wilbur and John Carlson were radio talk show hosts with regularly scheduled programs on 570 KVI AM, a radio station owned by Fisher Communications.163 As a part of their broadcasts, Wilbur and Carlson typically discussed their view on political and social issues.164 Fisher
charged for political advertising during the commercial segments of its
radio programs, but it did not charge for the value of any content time
associated with either Wilbur’s or Carlson’s talk shows.165
Wilbur and Carlson strongly criticized the legislature’s enactment
of the fuel tax166 and worked to support its repeal. In addition to their
support of the repeal of the tax, Wilbur and Carlson’s on-air comments
indicated that they were involved in the formation of an initiative campaign to repeal the tax.167
On May 6, 2005, No New Gas Tax (NNGT) registered with the
PDC as a political committee.168 The purpose of the committee was to
support a ballot measure, Initiative 912, that would have repealed the

162. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 4.
163. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. In early May 2005, Wilbur told his listeners: “[Carlson] and I have been meeting with a
number of people . . . . We a group of people have established an organization known as No New
Gas Tax. We have a website nonewgastax.com.” “[Carlson] and I got together based on our experiences and some others, we said okay look we are going to ask the audience to step forward and
pledge money and time at nonewgastax.com and that’s a website, nonewgastax.com, and we said if
we got 25,000 dollars of seed money and 1,000 volunteers [the campaign would be launched].”
Several days later, Wilbur and Carlson told their listeners that “according to the numbers uh that we
got over the weekend, over 81,000 dollars was raised in three and a half days.” Response Brief,
supra note 14, at 5.
168. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834.
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statewide fuel tax approved by the Washington legislature.169 The campaign had until July 8, 2005, to gather the required signatures.170
Once NNGT had registered as a political committee, Wilbur and
Carlson addressed their role in starting the campaign to repeal the tax
increase in a newspaper interview.171 They stated: “Our legal team is
writing the initiative . . . . We hope to file it this week.”172 Additionally,
a KVI press release discussed Wilbur and Carlson’s role in forming the
initiative campaign, stating: “KVI Country Delivers a Resounding ‘No’
to New Gas Tax. KVI’s Wilbur and Carlson raise funds and support for
‘No New Gas Tax’ effort.”173 During the first several weeks of the campaign, Wilbur and Carlson repeatedly asked their listeners for contributions.174
2. Legal Action
On June 22, 2005, the prosecuting authorities for San Juan County
and the cities of Auburn, Kent, and Seattle filed an action against
NNGT.175 They alleged that NNGT violated the disclosure provisions of
the FCPA by, in part, failing to report “valuable radio announcer professional services and valuable commercial radio airtime” as a campaign
contribution under Washington Revised Code § 42.17.020(15)(a) and
seeking an injunction to prevent NNGT from accepting in-kind contributions from Fisher Communications until it complied with the disclosure
requirements.176 The plaintiffs argued that Wilbur and Carlson were
spokespersons, officers, and agents for NNGT and that their conduct
constituted advertising for the campaign.177
169. Id.
170. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 4.
171. Id. at 5. See also Richard Roesler, Anti-gas-tax activists encounter legal hurdles,
SPOKESMANREVIEW.COM, July 2, 2005, available at http://www.spokesmanreview.com/
tools/story_pf.asp?ID=78291.
172. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 5.
173. Id. KVI’s general manager acknowledged in an internal memorandum the role Wilbur
and Carlson played in the campaign, stating that “the press release sent this week gives the appearance that we [KVI] are sponsoring this No New Gas Tax initiative.” Id. at 5−6.
174. Id. at 6. For example, Carlson told his listeners: “So, if you’re with me, check out this
website here . . . and sign up make a donation and let’s undue this thing. We got six weeks to get the
signatures and make this thing happen.” Id.
175. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 834 (Wa. 2007).. The complaint
further alleged that NNGT failed to adequately disclose the identities of Internet contributors and
that it made material misstatements regarding the fuel tax at issue. Id. at 834 n.2.
176. Id. at 834.
177. Id. NNGT asserted fourteen counterclaims against the plaintiffs, alleging that they violated its civil rights by bringing the enforcement action and obtaining the preliminary injunction.
Id. at 835–36 n.5. NNGT sought a declaratory judgment that the prosecutors violated its constitutional rights, injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecutors from continuing to commit the alleged
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In October 2005, the superior court granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction, “Requiring Compliance with Fair Campaign
Practices Act.”178 The court ruled that NNGT was required to disclose
the value of air time supporting the initiative campaign because it constituted an in-kind contribution of political advertising by Fisher Communications.179 The trial court issued an oral opinion and entered specific
findings in support of the preliminary injunction.180 The court found: (1)
that Wilbur and Carlson were principles in the campaign; (2) that Wilbur
and Carlson had intentionally promoted the campaign by advertising on
their radio shows; (3) that the on-air advertising was in addition to and
different from any editorializing, comment, or discussion by the hosts on
their shows; (4) that it had value to the campaign similar to advertising
the campaign could have purchased on air; (5) that the value of the advertising had not been disclosed to the PDC in the manner of any other
in-kind contribution; and (6) that requiring reporting of that value would
not restrict Wilbur or Carlson in their on-air speech in any way.181 The
preliminary injunction required disclosure of contributions prior to May
31, 2005.182
The I-912 campaign substantially complied with the preliminary injunction by identifying the source of its unreported monetary contributions and by disclosing the value of in-kind contributions of broadcast
time.183 The campaign disclosed a $20,000 contribution from Fisher
Broadcasting.184 On July 8, 2005, the I-912 campaign delivered the ne-

violations, vacation of the preliminary injunction order, and an award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 835–
36.
178. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 8. The trial court found that there was “inadequate time
or opportunity for [the county and city prosecutors] to resolve this matter through the PDC.” Id. at
7. Also, in response to questions from the I-912 campaign attorney, the court stated that it was not
requiring the campaign to do anything other than comply with existing disclosure laws. Id. at 8.
The trial court dismissed NNGT’s counterclaims and denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’
fees. Additionally, the trial court granted the prosecutors’ motion for voluntary dismissal of its
remaining claims. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 835–36.
179. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 837.
180. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 8.
181. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, No. 05-2-01205-3, 2005 WL 5167975 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2005).
182. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835.
183. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
184. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835. The preliminary injunction provided that if the campaign could not provide an exact valuation of the in-kind contribution, it should make a reasonable
and good-faith effort to make such a valuation. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 10. The trial court
declined to further clarify its order, stating: “you have the same problem that any other candidate or
campaign has in trying to understand how to make full reporting.” No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at
835.
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cessary signatures to the Secretary of State to have the initiative placed
on the November 8, 2005 ballot, where it was rejected by the voters.185
Pending its petition for discretionary review,186 NNGT filed a request for an emergency stay, in which NNGT claimed that it would have
no way to assess whether or when Washington’s $5,000 limit on contributions within twenty-one days prior to an election would be crossed by
Wilbur and Carlson’s discussion of the initiative on the air.187 The court
of appeals denied the stay but expedited the hearing for NNGT’s motion
for discretionary review.188
3. Reaction to the Superior Court Ruling
To many of those who worried about the possible abuse of campaign finance regulations, the superior court ruling in No New Gas Tax
served to justify their fears. Characterizing the radio hosts’ speech as a
contribution had two important legal consequences under the campaign
finance provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA).189 First,
the initiative campaign was required to assign a dollar value to the
speech and report it to the PDC.190 Second, the hosts would be precluded
from making more than $5,000 worth of such contributions to a candidate or initiative during the twenty-one days immediately preceding the
election.191

185. I-912 was rejected by margin of 54.6% to 45.4%. See Wash. Secretary of State 2005
Initiative Measures, available at http://www.vote.wa.gov/Elections/Results/Measures.aspx?e=
816913c8-43d7-4b77-be19-3d794615271e.
186. NNGT first sought discretionary review of the trial court order and requested a stay pending its resolution. A court of appeals commissioner denied the request, finding that NNGT was not
harmed by the lack of stay because the order required NNGT to disclose only the contributions received before May 31, 2005, and NNGT had complied with the order. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at
835.
187. Id. at 835. Fisher Communications’ general manager stated that he “will have to direct
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Wilbur to not discuss I-912 during the content portions on their programs to
avoid [the risk of violating the contribution limit] because Fisher Seattle Radio does not wish to face
a possible prosecution for violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act.” Id. In its opening brief to
the Washington State Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that the lack of any limitation on free
speech or “chilling” was demonstrated by events during the twenty-one days prior to the general
election. The plaintiffs noted that the talk show hosts continued to raise money for the campaign,
asking listeners to donate in the name of Judge Christopher Wickham, the trial court judge. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 17.
188. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835.
189. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Washington at 3, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax,
157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 1893968. The FCPA is also known as the Public
Disclosure Act. Id.
190. Id.; see also WASH.REV.CODE § 42.17.090 (2008).
191. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Washington, supra note 189, at 3. See also
WASH.REV.CODE § 42.17.105(8) (2008).
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Reaction to the superior court decision was swift and national in its
scope. Noted columnist George Will wrote in Newsweek: “What has
happened in Seattle prefigures what a national Democratic administration
might try to do―perhaps also by reviving the ‘fairness doctrine’ (an
‘equal time’ regulation)―to strangle conservative talk radio. And what
has happened here―the use of campaign regulations as a weapon of partisanship―is spreading.”192 A Wall Street Journal editorial cautioned:
“Consider what’s going on in Washington State as an early warning.”193
An editorial in the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review declared: “A cold front is
blowing in from Washington State. Calling it ‘chilling’ does not do it
justice. It should send a shudder down the spine of anyone who still believes in the First Amendment.”194
Although political talk radio is largely dominated by conservative
voices,195 the legal reaction against the trial court’s decision in No New
Gas Tax came from all sides of the political and ideological spectrums.196
When the case reached the Washington State Supreme Court, amicus
briefs were submitted from the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, the Cato Institute, the Washington Association of Broadcasters,
the Building Industry Association of Washington, and the Center for
Competitive Politics.197
4. Supreme Court Ruling
The Washington State Supreme Court accepted review of the case
based on the trial court’s CR 12(b)(6) dismissal of NNGT’s counterclaim
that the plaintiffs had violated several of the NNGT’s constitutional
rights by obtaining a preliminary injunction order requiring it to disclose
the value of radio broadcasts.198 Although the propriety of the preliminary injunction was not directly before the court (as the plaintiffs had
192. George F. Will, Speechless in Seattle: What has Happened in Seattle Prefigures What a
National Democratic Administration Might Try to Do to Stifle Conservative Talk Radio,
NEWSWEEK, at 24, Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/44879/page/1.
193. Brian C. Anderson, Commentary, Shut Up, They Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2006, at
E4, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007867.
194. Dimitri Vassilaros, Editorial, Well, Shut My Mouth!, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Nov.
28, 2005, at D2, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_398015.html.
195. See Michael Harrison, 2009 Talkers 250 Featuring the Heavy Hundred: The 100 Most
Important Radio Talk Show Hosts in America, TALKERS MAGAZINE, http://talkers.com/on
line/?p=267 (last visited July 15, 2009). Talkers Online Magazine annually ranks the top 100 “most
important” talk radio hosts in America. The majority of that list is composed of conservative talk
show hosts. Id.
196. Michael Bindas, Editorial, Preserving the Right to Free Speech, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, May 25, 2006, at E3, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/
271432_freespeech25.html.
197. Id.
198. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 833 (Wa. 2007).
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voluntarily dismissed their complaint against NNGT and NNGT did not
appeal), the court stated that it was necessary to review the issue in order
to resolve whether the trial court properly dismissed NNGT’s counterclaims.199
In its analysis, the court looked to whether the application of the
media exemption should have prevented the trial court from issuing the
preliminary injunction.200 The court first considered whether the trial
court correctly construed the statutory term “contribution,” noting that
the definition of contribution included the media exemption.201 The
court rejected the prosecutors’ argument that Wilbur and Carlson’s
broadcasts fell outside the media exemption because the broadcasts constituted “political advertising.”202 Instead, the court stated that it would
follow the approach taken by federal courts in applying the media exemption, looking first to whether the media exemption applies to the
communication at issue before considering whether the communication
fits within the otherwise broad definition of contribution.203
To determine whether the media exemption applied to the communication at issue, the court looked at whether the news medium was controlled by a candidate or political committee and whether it was functioning as a regular news medium with respect to the conduct in question.204
The court found that the phrase “not controlled by a candidate or political
committee” modifies “news medium” and does not modify “news item,
feature, commentary, or editorial.” 205 Therefore, the applicability of the
media exemption did not turn on Wilbur and Carlson’s relationship to the
campaign.206 “The question is whether the news medium―here, the ra199. Id. at 836–37. The court stated that because many of NNGT’s counterclaims originated
from the preliminary injunction order, and the trial court dismissed the counterclaims based on legal
determinations it made in the preliminary order, it must determine whether the trial court erred in
entering the injunction. Id at 836.. The court also noted that the standard of review regarding the
grant or denial of preliminary injunctions is the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 837.
200. Id.
201. Id..
202. Id. at 839.
203. Id. The court stated that this approach accords with the purpose of the media exemption,
which is to avoid burdening the First Amendment right of the press. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. In its amicus brief to the court in support of No New Gas Tax, the Washington State
Association of Broadcasters noted that this distinction was critical because it provides a clear rule
whereby the entity that provides the financing, i.e., the broadcaster, may also control compliance
with the exemption. By way of contrast, if the person who controls the news medium were deemed
to be the talk show host, then the broadcasting corporation might find itself in the position of having
unwittingly financed illegal contributions if the host is later determined by a court to have been a
“principal” of a campaign. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Association of Broadcasters at
18−19, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL
2303733.
206. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 839.
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dio station―is controlled by a political committee, not whether a political committee authored the content of a particular communication.”207
The court noted that, as with the federal media exemption, control does
not change from hour to hour depending on who may be hosting a particular radio program.208
Although the PDC had interpreted the applicability of the media
exemption differently, the court was not bound by such interpretations.209
The opinion quickly dismissed reliance on the previous PDC declarations
and opinions that stated that the use of air time to solicit votes or funds or
to expressly advocate either in favor of one’s own campaign or for the
defeat of one’s opponent constitutes a reportable contribution.210 The
court stated that: “We will not defer to a PDC declaratory order that conflicts with a statute.”211 In their opinion, however, the justices did not
examine the rationale employed by the PDC in reaching its conclusions
regarding the statute; rather, the court merely rejected PDC’s interpretations as contrary to the statutory media exemption.212
In ruling on its interpretation of the law, the court gave little consideration to the possible ramifications of its ruling. At oral argument,
the prosecutors argued that without the limiting construction imposed by
the PDC, media corporations could become “king makers,” providing
their favored candidates and ballot measure advocates with unlimited
access to the airwaves.213 Instead, the court found that while the term
“commentary” is not defined, it plainly encompassed advocacy for or
against an issue, candidate, or campaign, whether or not that involved the
solicitation of votes, money, or “other support.”214 Such express advocacy, the court continued, is “a core aspect of the media’s traditional
role.”215
In ruling that the media exemption applied, the court declared that it
was not appropriate to draw distinctions between commentary and political advertising in this context.216 The court stated that content was largely irrelevant in deciding whether a media entity is exercising its valid
press function; the media exemption applied regardless of the content of
the publication or the speaker’s motivations, intent, sources of informa207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 840.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. The court further declared that there “is no express advocacy or solicitation limitation
to the media exemption.” Id.
213. Id. at 840 n.10.
214. Id. at 840.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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tion, or connection with a campaign.217 Additionally, the media exemption could apply regardless of whether exercise of the media function
was fair, balanced, or expressed advocacy.218
The court did find, however, that the distinction between “political
advertising” and “commentary” might be relevant in deciding whether a
media entity was performing a legitimate press function, but it stated that
this distinction did not turn on the content of the communication.219 Instead, the court reasoned that the distinction turned on whether that
communication occurred during the period of the broadcast where payment is normally required.220 The court explained that if the coverage of
a candidate or ballot measure occurred during the content period of a
broadcast, as opposed to during the commercial advertising period, the
media exemption would apply.221 Therefore, the mere fact that a broadcast has value to a campaign, or includes solicitation of funds, votes, or
other support, does not convert commentary into advertising when it occurs during the content portion of a broadcast for which payment is not
normally required.222
The court found that this reasoning “appropriately creates a brightline rule by distinguishing paid and unpaid broadcast time.”223 Such a
rule would limit judicial inquiry into the content of the speech and focus
instead on the content-neutral question of whether the radio station ordinarily would collect a fee for the broadcast.224 Because the broadcasts in
question occurred during the regularly scheduled content portion of Wilbur and Carlson’s radio programs, not during the commercial advertising
time for which Fisher ordinarily collected a fee, the court found that
Wilbur and Carlson’s broadcasts supporting the initiative campaign did
fall within the media exemption, “regardless of whether the talk show

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 841.
220. Id. The court cited the PDC definition of political advertising as it relates to the media
exemption: Political advertising does not include letters to the editor, news or feature articles, editorial comment or replies thereto in a regularly published newspaper, periodical, or on a radio or
television broadcast where payment for the printed space or broadcast time is not normally required.
Id. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-05-290 (2008).
221. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 841.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 4 P.3d 808,
821–22 (Wa. 2000), which rejected “context” analysis in favor of Buckley’s bright-line express
advocacy test to avoid excessive “regulatory and judicial assessment of the meaning of political
speech”).
224. Id.
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hosts acted at the behest of NNGT or solicited votes and financial support for the initiative campaign.”225
Because the media exemption applied, the court held that the trial
court erred in ruling that the radio broadcasts were contributions subject
to disclosure under the FCPA.226 As the broadcasts were not contributions subject to disclosure, the court held that the trial court improperly
granted the preliminary injunction because the prosecutors failed to establish a clear and equitable right to disclosure of the value of the radio
broadcasts supporting the initiative campaign.”227
VI. WHERE DOES THE DECISION IN NO NEW GAS TAX LEAVE
WASHINGTON AND THE MEDIA EXEMPTION?
Although the ruling of the Washington State Supreme Court in No
New Gas Tax answered the specific issues regarding the NNGT campaign, it is the position of this Comment that the Court failed to satisfactorily resolve the larger questions involved. Campaign finance regulations seek to shed the bright light of publicity on the abuses and excesses
of campaign finance through the disclosure of contributions and expenditures. The in-kind contributions made when the media venture beyond
the reporting of news and editorial commentary to provide direct political
advertising or other support to a campaign are of value to that campaign
and should be disclosed.
After the November 2005 election, but prior to the Washington
State Supreme Court ruling in No New Gas Tax, Randall Gaylord, the
prosecutor for San Juan County in the case, wrote an editorial for The
Seattle Times in which he said: “Radio talk-show hosts want you to believe the judge trampled their free-speech rights. But [the trial judge]
was just confirming that anyone running an initiative campaign, no matter how prominent or powerful, must tell the public who is funding their
campaign.”228

225. Id. While the court articulated this bright-line rule, it thought it important to note in its
findings that the broadcasts in question were typical of Wilbur’s and Carlson’s regularly scheduled
programs. Id.
226. Id. at 842.
227. Id. Because it held that the radio broadcasts were not a contribution, the court did not
address the issue of whether the disclosure requirements of the FCPA were unconstitutional as applied to NNGT. Id. The court also reversed the order dismissing NNGT’s counterclaims and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of
attorneys’ fees to San Juan County. Id.
228. Randall Gaylord & Mike Vaska, Opinion, Even Radio Shock Jocks Must Obey Campaign
Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com
/archive/?date=20051109&slug=vaska09. Mike Vaska is an attorney with Foster Pepper & Shefelman who represented the plaintiffs in the No New Gas Tax litigation. Id.
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Gaylord stated that the sponsors of Initiative 276 decided that when
the media step outside their traditional news-gathering and editorial roles
to provide outright political advertising or other support to a campaign,
the contribution should be disclosed, just like in-kind corporate contributions of free software, cell phones, or office space.229 The First Amendment, Gaylord continued,
is not a shield that can be used to conceal campaign contributions―no matter their source or form. . . . The citizens who drafted
our public-disclosure laws understood the importance of openness
and accountability, and thus required media companies to comply
when they step into the fray by giving valuable support to a political
campaign.230

In the No New Gas Tax decision, the Washington State Supreme
Court articulated a bright-line rule regarding application of the media
exemption to what would otherwise be a contribution. As bright a line as
the court drew, however, the court was not looking to the question of
whether the media exemption should be narrowed; it merely interpreted
the law as it existed.
As FEC and PDC opinions indicate, there are other considerations
that might apply to an evaluation of the media exemption as it applies to
talk radio. In In re Ross, for example, to answer the question of whether
the station was acting within its legitimate press function, the FEC
looked to whether there was any indication that an aspect of the radio
show was different because of the nature of the host’s candidacy.231
Likewise, with regard to the Randall Terry program, the FEC concluded
that the candidate could continue to host his talk show, without receiving
an in-kind contribution, based on the candidate’s representation that he
did not intend to use the show to promote his candidacy.232 Similarly, in
Washington State, the PDC advised that a talk show host who was a candidate would receive an in-kind contribution from the radio station if,
while on the air, the host solicited votes or contributions.233
The rulings and opinions of the FEC, the PDC, and even the superior court in No New Gas Tax, further highlight the conflict that exists
between the application of the media exemption and the policy objectives
of campaign finance regulations. Given the court’s holding in No New
Gas Tax, there is seemingly no barrier to the extent to which a candidate
with a radio talk show might use his access to public airwaves to solicit
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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votes, contributions, or other forms of support. In theory, a corporation
that owned a radio station and had a particular political leaning could
seek to give support to a candidate by providing that candidate with a
radio show. So long as the corporation was not controlled by a political
committee and the function of the host was viewed as a legitimate press
activity,234 there is presumably no limit to the unregulated self-promotion
that such a candidate could do on air.
In a footnote, the No New Gas Tax court stated that nothing in its
decision foreclosed the state legislature, or the people via the initiative
process, from limiting the statutory media exemption.235 This Comment
proposes the form that such a limit should take.
While the elimination of the media exemption might be possible, it
is not desirable. Given state and federal limits on corporate contributions, and Washington’s imposition of a $5,000 cap on contributions in
the final three weeks before an election,236 if media commentary were an
in-kind contribution subject to those limits, broadcasters who chose to air
content qualifying as a contribution would, at some point, be required by
law to halt their speech. In addition to the possibility that some speech
would actually be stopped, the elimination of the media exemption
would also likely chill political speech if broadcasters chose to steer clear
of topics or hosts that could be seen as subjecting them to such contribution requirements. Also, it has largely been the established press, such as
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times
nationally, and The Seattle Times and Seattle Press Club in Washington
State, that have supported campaign finance reform.237 As one commentator noted, “there is no surer way to turn the press against campaign
finance reform than to subject the press to new restrictions.”238
It has been argued that the scope of the media exemption should be
narrowed by removing endorsements from the exemption’s coverage.239
Removing endorsements would, one author suggested, satisfy two competing interests: maintaining a free press and preventing corruption or the

234. As previously noted, the standard for what constitutes legitimate press activity is very
low. See Zubowicz, supra note 50, at 19.
235. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax,, 157 P.3d 831, 840 n.10 (Wa. 2007) (stating that
whether and to what extent the media exemption is constitutionally required is beyond the scope of
its opinion).
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.105(8) (2008).
237. Hasen, supra note 73, at 1664. See also Randall Gaylord & Mike Vaska, Opinion, Even
Radio Shock Jocks Must Obey Campaign Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20051109&slug=vaska09 (stating that
The Seattle Times endorsed Initiative 276 and the Seattle Press Club was one of its sponsors).
238. Hasen, supra note 73, at 1664.
239. Shapiro, supra note 55, at 188.
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appearance of corruption.240 While this proposal might prevent some
corruption, removing endorsements from the scope of the exemption
would seemingly have much the same chilling effect as doing away with
the media exemption as a whole. Bias is inherent in commentary and
opinion, and there is no bright line between biased opinion and support
or endorsement. The removal of endorsements from the protection of the
media exemption would undoubtedly lead to the removal of some comment as well.241
In talk radio, such a restriction would have broad application. Regardless of whether Wilbur and Carlson were principals in the NNGT
campaign, it is common for talk show hosts to express opinions about
controversial topics and to support or oppose candidates and initiatives.242
Additionally, if endorsements were subject to contribution or expenditure limits, a question of the value of each in-kind contribution for
on-air commentary would need to be made. For example, in a national
campaign, an endorsement from Rush Limbaugh would be worth more
than an endorsement from Kirby Wilbur.243 If their support was subject
to contribution limits, those talk radio hosts who were more popular or
powerful would actually be most affected by such contribution limits.
The political speech of Rush Limbaugh, for instance, would be more
likely to be chilled than the political speech of Kirby Wilbur.
Just as a narrowing of the media exemption to remove endorsements from its scope would have a chilling effect on protected speech, so
too would a narrowing of the media exemption to remove the commentary of candidates or principals in a campaign from the exemption. If the
existence of contributions turns on whether the host might be considered
a principal of a campaign, then broadcasters would be forced to start
monitoring the political behavior of their employees before letting them
advocate for or against controversial topics.244 If broadcasters did not,

240. Id.
241. Would removing endorsements from the protections of the media exemption actually
make a difference? Professor Hasen has argued that it is the slant of the news, rather than endorsements, that gives the media unequal power to influence political outcomes. Thus, one can end special treatment for the press, but it will not affect the power of the media to follow an electoral or
legislative strategy. Hasen, supra note 73, at 1659.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 4−7.
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Show
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In
America,
TALKERS
MAGAZINE,
http://talkers.com/online/?p=267 (last visited July 15, 2009).
244. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Association of Broadcasters at 5, San Juan
County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 2303733.
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they would run the risk of finding out after the fact that otherwise apparently legal broadcasts were actually illegal contributions.245
The media exemption could, however, be narrowed to more fully
achieve the policy objectives of campaign finance reform, while still preserving the fundamental First Amendment protections of the press. The
narrowing could take the form of a requirement that talk show hosts who
do not equally present both sides of campaign issues must file a report
with the PDC or an alternate regulatory agency.246 The report would
show the duration and value of the air time provided so that the public
would know the equivalent amount of money an opponent would have to
spend to buy air time to promote their views or candidacy.247
Although the question of the valuation of on-air time would need to
be resolved, such valuation could easily be made based on advertising
rates for the particular host’s program and the time the host spent commenting on a particular issue. Using this method of valuation, the calculation would be relatively easy to make. If the reported duration and value were not considered part of the contribution limits, the approach
would not conflict with current campaign regulations and would not
dampen constitutional rights.
Under this proposal for narrowing the media exemption, a corporation that owned a radio station and had a particular political leaning
could still seek to give support to a candidate by providing that candidate
with a radio show. That support, however, would be disclosed to the
public and have a dollar value for that contribution. Thus, while the public would know who was contributing to a campaign, the corporation
would not be limited in its support, nor would the talk show host be limited in his commentary.
As a whole, this approach preserves the policies of campaign
finance reform without the result of chilling or otherwise limiting socially useful and constitutionally protected campaign speech. “The electorate . . . ha[s] the right to know of the sources and magnitude of financial
and persuasional influences upon government.”248 By narrowing the media exemption as suggested in this Comment, the information base upon
which the electorate may make its decisions is enlarged without weakening our First Amendment protections.
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246. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
One can imagine many circumstances in which the conduct of a radio talk show host should, in some form, be disclosed as a contribution to
or expenditure of a political campaign. Given current federal and state
limits on expenditure and contributions at various points within a campaign, including the conduct of talk show hosts as a contribution or expenditure would certainly have the effect of limiting that speech. Without question, public disclosure of campaign contributions is a worthy
goal, but if achieving such a goal comes at the expense of political
speech, such a goal would be both difficult to achieve and undesirable.
If not subject to those limits, however, such disclosure would be desirable.
The FEC, PDC, and Washington State courts have taken alternate,
and sometimes conflicting, approaches in their efforts to determine the
extent of the media exemption as it applies to talk radio. By attempting
to shoehorn the particular host’s activity into a form of advertising or
into a legitimate press function, however, the underlying issues at the
heart of the tension between the goals of campaign finance regulations
and First Amendment protections are often neglected.
Campaign finance regulations have existed since the nineteenth
century and have had, at their core, the notion that the public should
know who is contributing to political campaigns. Campaign finance regulations are a policy choice—a choice to control the influence of money
in the political process at the expense of a degree of constitutional protection on speech and the press. Likewise, the media exemption is a policy choice—a choice to accord full protection to the First Amendment
rights of the press at the expense of countervailing social interests that
may be served by campaign finance regulations. If the goals of campaign finance reform are served by requiring disclosure of corporate contributions, they will be better served by requiring the disclosure of inkind contributions from radio talk show hosts who do not equally present
both sides of an issue.
It is possible to more fully achieve campaign-finance policy objectives without further sacrificing those protections we hold dear. By narrowing the media exemption such that disclosure of on-air contributions
would be required as part of campaign finance regulations, while continuing to exempt the media from strict campaign contribution and expenditure limits, it would be possible to better balance the competing interests
of campaign finance regulations and the protection of the press. Such a
plan would not chill political speech. Instead, the knowledge of who was
contributing to political campaigns would be increased and the policy
objectives of campaign finance reform would be more fully achieved.

